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WHY THE BOTTOM LINE IS NOT THE
BOTTOM LINE: JOHN PAUL II'S
CONCEPT OF BUSINESS
JOHN F. COVERDALEt
Many observers have noted that American corporate law
lacks a sound foundation. The participants in a symposium on
the most recent attempt to systematize American corporate law,
the American Law Institute's ambitious Principles of Corporate
Governance,' criticized the Institute's efforts from many different
perspectives, but agreed that "[t]he Principles lack a clear and
coherent theory of the corporation. '2 Delaware corporate law has
been faulted for being "incoherent, [and] lacking an animating
principle." 3 Professor Mitchell has described the question of "the
nature and purpose of the corporation" as "the great unanswered
question in corporate law."4
The lack of adequate principles for thinking about business
is not confined to the issues of ownership and governance
structure that are the province of corporate lawyers. The
unanswered question about the nature of business extends far
beyond the bounds of traditional corporate law. If we are to have
an adequate legal framework for governing business, we cannot
confine ourselves to questions about ownership and governance.
We need to ask how we should structure business activity to
t Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge research assistance from Peter Knob and financial support from Seton
Hall University School of Law Summer Research Program.
1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
2 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 872 (1993).
3 Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the
Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 523 (2003).
4 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 875. See generally MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE
RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY 165 (2001) (noting
that corporate American law lacks a "coherent underlying concept of the
corporation").
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reflect the proper role of work and economic activity in our
personal and collective lives.
This article proposes that useful principles for answering
that question can be found in the writings of John Paul II. He
offers a thick vision of economic activity and business grounded
on a philosophical and theological anthropology which avoids the
pitfalls of both individualism and collectivism. That vision of
economic activity and business provides a suitable foundation for
thinking about the legal issues of the structure of business
organizations, the relations between employers and employees,
the goals of business, and business governance.
The purpose of this article is not to propose concrete legal
reforms, but to introduce readers to John Paul II's vision of how
economic activity and business fit into human life and into the
effort to achieve human fulfillment. This question may seem far
removed from day-to-day legal issues about employer-employee
relations, the role of community interests in business decision-
making, or the powers of directors. It is, in fact, far removed
from them in the sense that careful legal and economic analysis
is required to translate a vision of business activity as it relates
to human fulfillment into workable legal principles. On the other
hand, an adequate understanding of these great issues is the
essential foundation for a satisfactory resolution of the technical
issues. If form follows function, as Louis Sullivan, the father of
modern American architecture, taught,5 we cannot hope to
regulate businesses intelligently without an adequate grasp of
their purpose and their role in human life. But our
understanding of the purpose of business and its role in our lives
must ultimately rest on a view of what it is to be human and to
achieve human fulfillment. 6
Although the principal focus of this article is John Paul II's
thought, it begins with a lengthy summary and critique of
current American legal thinking about business. The purpose of
this critique is to suggest the need for the fresh insights which
5 See, e.g., DAVID VAN ZANTEN & CERVIN ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN'S CITY: THE
MEANING OF ORNAMENT FOR Louis SULLIVAN (2000).
6 Cf. Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 866-67 (2004) (arguing that improvements in corporate
law require rejecting the individualistic view of human nature reflected in law and
economics and adopting a more communitarian view, which is supported by most
religious traditions).
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John Paul II offers. It would be impossible to present in brief
compass even a skeletal outline of all the issues. Part I,
therefore, focuses on the three principal strands in American
legal thought regarding business organizations and, more
particularly, corporations. Section A deals with the ownership
model; Section B, the nexus of contract model; Section C, the
stakeholder model. Part II, the heart of this article, synthesizes
the thought of John Paul II. It is divided into five sections:
Section A discusses John Paul II's thought on the value and
dignity of human persons; Section B, community; Section C, work
and workers; Section D, property and markets; and Section E,
the role of profit and efficiency in business. Finally, I offer some
broad conclusions.
I. THREE CURRENT MODELS OF BUSINESS
A. The Ownership Model
The classic model of business firms, and concretely of
corporations, is that they are entities owned by their
shareholders and, thus, should be managed to serve their
shareholders' interests. 7 This model reflects popular ways of
thinking about businesses. It enjoyed widespread acceptance in
the legal and academic community during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. During that time even large
businesses were often the creations of engineer-entrepreneurs,
7 The classic citation is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919), where the court states that "it is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape ... the affairs of a corporation" for the primary benefit of anyone
other than the shareholders. While the court does not explicitly discuss the
ownership model of corporations, that model underlies the opinion. As is often the
case with widely held theories, many who hold the ownership model are not
explicitly aware of holding any particular theory; it simply seems obvious that the
shareholders own the business. See Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and
Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 147, 147 (2001) (noting that the theory that a
corporation is the property of its shareholders is one of the theories that is "so widely
accepted that we forget they are theories"). The ALI uses the ownership model at
some points, for instance as a justification for restricting the right to bring derivate
suits by shareholders. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 7.02. A contemporary
modified version of the ownership model can be found in Margaret Blair's book. See
generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 223-25 (1995) (seeing workers and
other stakeholders, not only shareholders, as owners of businesses, but treating
businesses as entities which someone "owns" in a meaningful sense).
2006]
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and the physical capital contributed by the entrepreneurs often
played a decisive role in the life of the business. In recent times,
the leading proponent of this model is Milton Friedman, who
used the idea of business ownership to justify shareholder wealth
maximization as the appropriate goal of business managers.8
The concept of shareholders as owning businesses, while
widely held, clashes with the realities of the business world in
which employees and their ideas are often the core of the
business. Because it reflects a monolithic view of ownership, it is
also incompatible with contemporary legal concepts of property,
which consider property as a group of rights that can be divided
among multiple owners in diverse ways.9 For these reasons, as
early as 1946, Peter Drucker dismissed the ownership model of
business as a "crude old legal fiction."'10
In light of contemporary property theory, efforts to identify
"the owners" of the business are of little value in determining
how the business should be managed and whose interests it
should serve:
It is old-fashioned, misleading and unproductive to identify a
single "owner" of valued resources when control of those
resources has been divided by law or contract among several
interested parties.... [P]hrasing the problem as "identifying
the owner" is fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right
question. To assume that we can know who property owners
are, and to assume that once we have identified them their
rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what needs to
be decided."
The rights society recognizes in owners of property reflect
concepts of justice, which in turn rest on assessments of moral
8 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM] (analyzing the nature of competitive capitalism
as well as the link that exists between a society based on competitive capitalism and
its citizens' political and economic freedoms); Milton Friedman, A Friedman
Doctrine--The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33, reprinted in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 51
(Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) (treating property as
a bundle of rights).
10 PETER DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 30 (1946), quoted in JAMES
E. POST ET AL., REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 13 (2002).
11 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611,637-38 (1988).
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entitlements to derive benefits from an asset based on effort,
sacrifice, contribution, or prior arrangement. 2 Undoubtedly, the
shareholders who have contributed financial assets to a business
have some moral claim on the benefits it produces, but so do
many other people who have contributed to the formation and
growth of the business. Treating the shareholders as "the
owners" of the business obscures the fact that their claim "is only
different in degree from that of other stakeholders ... not
different in kind."'13
The shareholders do not own the business in the manner in
which they own a handkerchief or a piece of land.14 They only
actually own their shares. 15 That provides them with four rights:
1) to receive distributions of corporate income if the directors
choose to authorize such distributions; 2) to receive fractional
distributions of the corporate property if the corporation is
dissolved; 3) to vote in the election of directors and on certain
other occasions; and 4) to sell their securities to others. They do
not own the physical assets of the business, 16 much less the
employees who, in many cases, are the source of most of the
value of the business.' 7 Therefore, it is not helpful to think of a
business primarily as an entity owned by shareholders.18
12 See BLAIR, supra note 7, at 224-25.
13 ROBERT PHILLIPS, STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 157
(2003).
14 See BLAIR, supra note 7, at 5 ("In large, publicly traded corporations, the
normal rights that constitute ownership of real property have been unbundled and
parceled out to numerous participants in the enterprise.... Thus taking 'ownership'
as the starting point... from which certain rights or claims are supposed to follow,
is quite problematic.").
15 MICHEL AGLIETA & ANTONIE REBERIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT:
A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 263-64 (2005); PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at
156.
16 To illustrate this concept, imagine an owner of 1000 shares of Dell stock
attempting to enter a Dell assembly facility and claiming, when stopped at the gate
by a guard, that he or she is the owner of the factory.
17 To take one example, Google's market capitalization is in excess of $100
billion. According to its Form 10-Q for the quarter ending December 31, 2006, the
net book value of its property and equipment was less than $3 billion, and the net
book value of its intangible assets less than $400 million. See Financial Release,
Google, Google Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2006 Results (Jan. 31,
2007), http://investor.google.com/releases/2006Q4.html.
18 See Jeff Gates, Reengineering Ownership for the Common Good, in
RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS 264-82 (S.A. Cortright & Michael J.
Naughton eds., 2002) (promoting the reengineering of the concept of property
ownership); AGLIETTA & REBERIOUX, supra note 15, at 263; KELLY, supra note 4, at
2006]
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B. The Nexus of Contract Model
Most contemporary legal academic thought conceives of a
business firm as a nexus of contracts. The roots of the nexus of
contract approach can be traced to an article published in 1937
by Ronald Coase in which he analyzed firms and markets as
alternative forms of contracting. 19 In markets, the price
mechanism controls production by distributing factors of
production to various functions. According to Coase, managers in
firms distribute the factors of production by assigning tasks.20
The choice between contracts involving markets that rely on the
price mechanism and contracts involving firms that use
hierarchical commands to assign factors of production depends
on the relationship between the transaction costs of contracting
de novo each time a factor is needed and the inefficiencies that
arise from using authority structures. 21 Where the transaction
costs exceed the costs imposed by the inefficiencies of command
structures, costs can be reduced by giving one party authority to
set, within certain limits, the terms of the contract. 22
Coase's concept of transaction costs as the explanation of
why firms exist lay dormant until the 1970s when Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz employed it in their influential
article, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization.23  Although starting with Coase's focus on
transaction costs, Alchain and Demsetz rejected Coase's model of
the firm as characterized by authority. 24 They claimed that
41 (comparing the view that shareholders as "owners" are entitled to break up
corporations, load them with debt, or shut them down leaving the employees to fend
for themselves with the feudal view that the owner of the land owned the serfs who
worked it).
19 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937) (analyzing the firm as an alternative form of contracting).
20 See id. at 391.
21 See id. at 387-98 (explaining that firms are profitable because they decrease
market costs by reducing the steps involved in repeat transactions, but that
efficiency wanes as the size of a firm increases, and thus the goal of a firm is to seek
an ideal balance between competing needs for both flexibility and organization).
22 See id. at 390-92 (indicating that by allowing some authority to direct
resources and set general contract terms, certain market costs are saved).
23 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972) ("Coase's penetrating
insight is to make more of the fact that markets do not operate costlessly, and he
relies on the cost of using markets to form contracts as his basic explanation for the
existence of firms.").
24 See id. at 777-78, 783-84 (opining that a firm has "no power of fiat, no
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relations within firms are purely contractual, and that authority
within firms is an illusion. 25
In their view, firms exist to reduce the costs of monitoring,
made necessary by the fact that the contracts the parties enter
are necessarily incomplete since the parties cannot foresee all
eventualities. The way to reduce these costs is not to replace
market-based contracts with authority structures, but to give to a
monitor the right to: 1) claim the residual value once all other
parties have been paid; 2) monitor the behavior of all other
parties providing inputs; 3) be the central party, common to all
contracts with input providers; 4) make and terminate the
contracts with other input providers; and 5) sell rights one
through four.26 Not coincidentally, these are the rights of the
owner of a privately held business.
This theory was taken a step further by Michael Jensen and
W.H. Meckling, who argued that the firm is merely a fiction
serving as a nexus for the various explicit and implicit contracts
of which it is comprised.27  From this perspective, "the
personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as
'what should be the objective function of the firm' . . . is seriously
misleading. The firm is not an individual.... The 'behavior' of
the firm is like the behavior of a market, i.e., the outcome of a
complex equilibrium process. '"28
The economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts has
undergone much evolution and exists in a multitude of different
incarnations. 29  It was enthusiastically embraced by legal
authority").
25 According to Alchian and Demsetz, managers of firms have no more authority
over their employees than customers have over their grocers. See id. at 777-78. If
the grocer attempts to sell cookies when the customer wants bread, the customer
will stop doing business with the grocer and go to another store. Similarly, an
employee who fails to carry out the duties assigned by the manager will be fired. Id.
at 777.
26 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 23, at 783.
27 See Michael C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
For a more recent elaboration of the theory, see MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF
THE FIRM 87-135 (2000).
28 Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1764 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Jensen & Meckling, supra note
27, at 310).
29 As early as 1988, one author could observe that "[a] single, detailed picture of
the firm will not emerge from the school." William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 419 (1989).
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academics of the law and economics school, particularly by the
Chicago brand of law and economics, 30 and has come to dominate
corporate legal scholarship. 31
Few of the economists who developed the nexus of contract
approach or the legal theorists who have built on their work have
elaborated much on the underlying anthropological foundations
of the theory. The contractarian world view rests, however, on
highly individualistic normative assumptions. 32 It "focuses on
the individual as an autonomous being and is based on a
particular vision of human liberty as freedom from external,
unconsented-to restraint."33 The economic actors it envisions are
rational wealth-maximizers.3 4
Contractarians claim that the group interests which firms
appear to embody are merely instrumental devices serving
individual interests. Thus, they explain the cooperation that
exists within firms as a way of increasing productivity. 35 They
reject the contention that team spirit reflects an inherent
orientation toward others or even the psychological rewards of
participation. Instead they characterize it as merely a way of
increasing payoffs for individuals. 36
Legal theorists who adopt the nexus of contract approach generally ignore altogether
the rich economic literature that continues to build on Coase's initial insight that
markets and organizations are fundamentally different ways of structuring economic
activity. For a useful introductory survey of this literature, see SYTSE DOUMA &
HEIN SCHREUDER, ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2002).
30 For the most important and influential statement of this theory, see FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL F. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 34-35 (1991).
31 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1993) (indicating that the theory dominates
corporate legal scholarship). Allen served as Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery.
32 See Stabile, supra note 6, at 858 (stating that through the lens of law and
economics, "[t]he corporation is simply an aggregate of independent contractors,
each pursuing her own interests, with each individual presumed capable of looking
out for that interest").
33 David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1382 (1993).
34 Bratton, supra note 29, at 417; see also Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980); Michael Jensen,
Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 331 (1983).
35 See Bratton, supra note 29, at 428-29.
36 See id. ("Cooperation becomes a means to the end of productivity."); see also
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 23, at 790-91 (stressing that the goal of cooperation
is not a sense of loyalty, but reducing costs); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops
and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 14 (2002) ('The
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Contractarians view as presumptively illegitimate all legal
rules that interfere with the ability of individuals to structure
their relationships with others and to define their duties toward
them on the basis of freely given consent. 37 Broader goals and
higher aspirations than accumulation of wealth need not be
considered when thinking about firms. In the view of the
contractarians, "[n]o other values exist in group economic life
other than self-interested rationality. '38
This is an extremely thin, impoverished view of human
motivation and behavior.3 9 Thin visions may be appropriate in
certain circumstances. If, for instance, I am looking for a store
from which to buy a package of chewing gum, the only relevant
factors may be location and availability of the brand I prefer. If,
however, I am trying to provide a foundation for legal rules that
will regulate the operation of stores, I will need to know a great
deal about the function of stores and their impact on their
employees and on the communities they serve. If my goal is the
still broader one of providing a foundation for legal rules that
govern all businesses, the need for a thick vision is even more
evident. The anthropology of John Paul II explored in Part II of
this article offers the sort of thick view of what it is to be human
and consequently of the nature and purpose of firms that can
provide an adequate foundation for the legal regulation of
business.
Describing the firm as a mere nexus of contracts does not
directly answer the question of which of the many contracting
parties should be given the right to monitor the behavior of the
other parties and to appropriate the residual value of the firm.40
Adherents to the nexus of contract view of firms argue that those
rights should be given to the investors. Their argument runs in
economists' contractual understanding of the firm is not communitarian in nature.").
37 See Allen, supra note 31, at 1395, 1401 (noting the difficulty advocates of the
contractarian model have in imagining any alternative view).
38 Bratton, supra note 29, at 429.
39 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1057 (1996) (opining that the
corporate law shareholder "is an abstraction from the full human beings who
ultimately own shares; in the process of abstraction, it becomes radically different
from any human.").
40 See John R. Boatright, Business Ethics and the Theory of the Firm, 34 AM.
Bus. L.J. 217, 222-23, 226-27 (1996) (discussing potential conflicts of interest as
well as which party's interests are best for all).
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simplified terms as follows 41: Team production is often more
efficient than individual efforts, but brings with it moral hazards
because it is difficult to know how much an individual team
member has contributed to the productive process. The team
member may, therefore, be tempted to shirk. To reduce the cost
of shirking, team production requires a monitor whose task it is
to ensure each team member makes his or her full contribution.
The monitor, however, may also be tempted to shirk. The
cost of shirking by the monitor can be reduced if the monitor
enters into contracts under which the monitor is the party that
bears the residual risk and receives the residual gain. This
occurs when the monitor pays all other input-providers the
opportunity cost of the inputs they provide (i.e., what they could
get if they sold their inputs to the next highest bidder), and the
monitor receives whatever is left after all other input-providers
have been paid. Under such a scheme, the monitor has an
incentive to maximize the wealth produced because the monitor
will receive everything over and above the opportunity cost of the
other inputs.
The law and economics literature generally assumes that the
residual risk of firms is borne by the owner-manager of small
firms and by the shareholders of corporations. 42 As risk takers,
they should receive the residual value, and the firm should be
managed to increase their wealth. In publicly-held corporations
the shareholders do not in fact directly monitor operations;
hierarchical decision-making and oversight by the board of
directors are substitutes for such oversight. From this,
contractarians conclude that boards of directors should represent
the interests of the shareholders and require managers to
maximize shareholder wealth. 43
Partisans of this theory claim that managing firms to
maximize profits, and thereby shareholder wealth,
"automatically" benefits not only shareholders but all corporate
constituencies:
41 The summary of this argument is taken with small changes from BLAIR,
supra note 7, at 228-29.
42 See, e.g., GREGORY K. Dow, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 115 (2003) (explaining that "[a] standard idea" is that
residual claimants-those entitled to any profits remaining after all contractual
payments are made-bear risk).
43 See BLAIR, supra note 7, at 228-29.
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In a market economy each party to a transaction is better off. A
successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and services
for consumers .... Wealthy firms provide better working
conditions and clean up their outfalls; high profits produce
social wealth that strengthens the demand for
cleanliness.... Firms that close plants in one area while
relocating production elsewhere are accused of lacking a sense
of responsibility to affected workers and communities. Yet such
a statement ignores the greater benefits that workers and
communities in the new locale enjoy. (They must be greater, or
there would be no profit in the move.) 44
Legal academics often treat as dogmas, or at least as firmly
established scientific truths, both the nexus of contract approach
to firms and the residual risk justification of shareholder wealth
maximization as the goal of firm management. 45 Yet, however
44 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 38-39. That new workers and
communities--and not only the shareholders-will enjoy greater benefits seems to
be an act of faith rather than the evident proposition as it is presented by the
authors. Furthermore, as a major recent casebook notes:
When a solvent corporation pursues its regular business activities, the
interests of its management, creditors, employees, and stockholders are
largely congruent with the interests of its equity investors. Thus, it makes
no difference whether managers think of themselves as furthering long-
term shareholder interests or furthering a multiconstituency interest in
long-term corporate welfare.
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAw
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 286 (2003). The authors elaborate on this point:
[T]here is today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are
the parties to whom corporate managers should be accountable .... This is
not to say that there is agreement that corporations should be run in the
interests of shareholders alone-much less that the law should sanction
that result. All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should
be organized and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and
that the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social
calculus than do the interests of any other members of society. The point is
simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is
convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the
pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly
accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to
those interests.
Id.
45 See Allen, supra note 31, at 1401 ("For many corporation law scholars [the
nexus of contract theory] is indisputably correct; its statement is seen as one of
fact."); Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited,
15 ORG. SCI. 350, 350 (2004) ("In the field of finance, the logic of shareholder value
maximization is accepted as being so obvious that textbooks just assert it, rather
than argue for it.").
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elegant the theories may be, and however useful they may prove
in certain limited contexts, both are open to question.
46
It is possible to model some of the relationships that exist
within a firm as if the firm were merely a legal fiction that brings
together explicit and implicit contracts, but this is an extremely
thin vision of what firms are.47 Most people who have worked in
a large firm can testify, not only to the existence of hierarchy and
bureaucracy, but also to the fact that firms constitute
overarching human communities within which many smaller
communities exist. Such communities have distinctive cultures
and pursue diverse goals, even within a given industry.48 To
ignore these facts in constructing a legal regime is to build on a
very partial and incomplete view of reality.
To treat shareholders as the parties who bear the entire
residual risk of a firm is also to ignore reality. Employees often
develop firm-specific human capital, which cannot be transferred
easily to another firm.49 This is especially true in technology-
intensive and service-oriented businesses, which are increasingly
important in modern economies. 50 In such cases, the employees
46 Harvard economist Oliver Hart writes:
An outsider to the field of economics would probably take it for granted
that economists have a highly developed theory of the firm. After all, firms
are the engines of growth of modern capitalistic economies, and so
economists must surely have fairly sophisticated views of how they behave.
In fact, little could be further from the truth. Most formal models of the
firm are extremely rudimentary, capable only of portraying hypothetical
firms that bear little relation to the complex organizations we see in the
world. Furthermore, theories that attempt to incorporate real world
features of corporations, partnerships and the like often lack precision and
rigor, and have therefore failed, by and large, to be accepted by the
theoretical mainstream.
Hart, supra note 28, at 1757.
47 See Allen, supra note 31, at 1401 (opining that, from a realist perspective, the
nexus of contracts approach "overlook[s] an essential part of the empirical reality of
social interactions 'within' corporations" and that it is a "palpably impoverished"
way of interpreting corporations).
48 See, e.g., RICHARD S. GALLAGHER, THE SOUL OF AN ORGANIZATION:
UNDERSTANDING THE VALUES THAT DRIVE SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE CULTURES
(2003); ALFONS TROMPENAARS & PETER PRUD'HOMME, MANAGING CHANGE ACROSS
CORPORATE CULTURES (2004). One of the great challenges in merging companies is
the differences in corporate cultures. See IRENE RODGERS ET AL., SUCCESSFUL
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: HOW TO BRIDGE CORPORATE
CULTURES (2002).
49 See BLAIR, supra note 7 at 289-91.
50 See id. at 238.
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have as much of a "stake" in the firm as do the shareholders. 51 If
anything, shareholders may be less exposed to firm-specific risk
than other firm constituents. Investments in firms-at least in
publicly held firms-are quite liquid, so that shareholders can
divest themselves of their investments with relative ease.52
Furthermore, through diversification of their portfolios,
shareholders can reduce firm-specific risk,53 eliminating as much
as eighty to ninety percent of it.54
Employees are not the only group beside shareholders who
put assets at risk in a firm. Suppliers may expand their capacity
or locate their facilities in a particular location in order to service
a customer. Customers may invest time and money in training
people to use particular products provided by a specific firm.
Local communities may expand their facilities to provide services
to a firm and its employees. The investments of employees and
other stakeholders are often at risk as much as the investments
of shareholders. 55 If the criterion for deciding what party should
have control of the firm and what party's interests managers
51 See DRUCKER, supra note 10, at 16 ("Commitment to working within and
among specific organizations, and development of situation-specific capabilities that
serve organization purposes, involves investments comparable to-and possibly
rarer and more valuable than-the financial investments of shareowners."); PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 351
(1992) ('With high levels of firm-specific human capital, the decisions taken by the
firm place risks on employees' human assets that are comparable to those borne by
investors in physical capital. Protecting the value of this human capital then
requires that employees' interest figure into the firm's decision-making.").
52 See AGLIETTA & REBERIOUX, supra note 15, at 266.
53 BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 313 (8th ed. 2003).
The well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts that the market will not
reward investors for taking firm-specific risks. The significant factor in determining
asset prices is not the specific risk of the firm, but its contribution to the risk of a
market portfolio. See id. at 231-32. For a discussion of stock pricing formulas, see
generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). Approximately half of all the shares of
publicly traded American companies are owned by institutional investors, all of
which own diversified portfolios. Greenwood, supra note 39, at 1066. In addition,
many-probably most-individual investors own diversified portfolios that enable
them to diversify away firm specific risk. To characterize shareholders as the
principal or sole bearers of the residual risk of the firm is to ignore these realities.
54 Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate
Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 179, 206 (2001).
55 See BLAIR, supra note 7 at 15; DOw, supra note 42, at 115 (asserting that
creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees are all exposed to firm-specific risk).
20061
486 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:473
should serve is capital at risk, employees and other stakeholders
often have as good a claim as shareholders.
Contractarians do not deny that workers and other
stakeholders often have firm specific assets at risk. They assert,
however, that, unlike shareholders, workers and other
stakeholders are able to protect themselves against those risks
through the terms of their contracts. 56 Whatever risk they bear
is compensated for by the contractual payments they receive and,
thus, there is no need to take it into account in managing the
firm.57
The contracts of workers and other stakeholders are clearly
different from those of shareholders. They specify what reward
the workers and other stakeholders will receive for the inputs
they provide to the firm, whereas shareholders have no right to a
specific return on their investment and are entitled only to the
residual after all other claims have been satisfied. In the real
world, however, in which workers and other stakeholders have
limited information and limited bargaining power, they are
rarely able to negotiate the contracts which economic theory
suggests would compensate them for all risk.58 The risk-bearing
justification for shareholder-wealth-maximization as the goal of
firms is, therefore, unsatisfying.
C. The Stakeholder Model
In contrast to shareholder-centered models of business,
stakeholder theory requires managers to take into account the
interests of all those who have a stake in the business.59 In the
two decades since the 1984 publication of Freeman's Strategic
Management: A Stakeholder Approach,60 management theorists
and business ethicists have developed a broad array of
56 See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 538 n.8 (2006).
57 See id. n.7 ('Market forces determine the overall balance of advantage in the
arrangements between shareholders and non-shareholders.").
58 See generally Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 859 (2003) (discussing the reasons
for the divergence between the types of contracts predicted by economic theory and
those observed in the real world).
59 See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 24-25 (1984) (outlining and illustrating the stakeholder approach).
60 Id.
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stakeholder theories. These theories operate at three levels:
descriptive, instrumental, and normative. 61
At the descriptive level, stakeholder theories present the
idea of a business as "an organization engaged in mobilizing
resources for productive uses in order to create wealth and other
benefits (and not to intentionally destroy wealth, increase risk, or
cause harm) for its multiple constituents, or stakeholders."62
This implies that "corporate performance should be [and is]
appraised from multiple perspectives. The interests of
shareowners are, of course, among these, but they are not always
primary and never exclusive."6 3A major challenge for stakeholder theory is defining who
should be considered a stakeholder. Freeman defines
stakeholders very broadly to include all those who are affected by
or affect a particular business.6 4  Freeman even includes
competitors, political groups, trade associations, and activist
groups among stakeholders.6 5 Although managers should keep
an eye on all of the individuals and groups who might in any way
impact a business, including competitors and activists, it is not
helpful to lump them all together under the heading of
stakeholders. A more useful definition limits stakeholders of a
business to "the individuals and constituencies that contribute,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity
and activities, and that are therefore its potential beneficiaries
and/or risk bearers. '6 6 Obviously, not even all those who fall
within this narrower definition of stakeholders are equally
important to a business. Empirical research shows that
managers focus primarily on shareholders, customers, and
employees .67
61 See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 66-67
(1995).
62 POST ET AL., supra note 10, at 17 (emphasis omitted); see also Donaldson &
Preston, supra note 61, at 66 (defining a "corporation as a constellation of
cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value.").
63 POST ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
64 See FREEMAN, supra note 59, at 52 ("[Stakeholders are] groups and
individuals who can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organization's
mission.").
65 See id. at 55 fig.3.1.
66 POST ET AL., supra note 10, at 19 (emphasis omitted).
67 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 61, at 75 (supporting the claim that a
majority of managers "regard[] it as unethical management behavior to focus solely
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There is ample evidence to support the view that business
managers not only should, but do, in fact, strive to create wealth
and other benefits for a range of stakeholders, especially
customers and employees as well as shareholders. In the mid-
1960s, well before the term "stakeholder management" 68 became
popular, a survey of upper level managers revealed that an
overwhelming majority focused on the interests of employees,
customers, and shareholders.69 Since then, numerous studies
have confirmed that upper level managers strive to satisfy an
array of interested parties and are not guided solely by the desire
to increase shareholder profit.70  The failure of the various
shareholder-wealth-maximization theories that dominate the
legal literature to account for or even acknowledge the actual
practice of businesses is a striking weakness of those theories.
In addition to describing actual practice, much stakeholder
theory is instrumental. It purports to offer a way to improve
business management and ultimately increase profitability. 71
Indeed, as originally proposed by Freeman, stakeholder theory is
largely instrumental. Freeman argues that managers should
take into account the interests of various stakeholders, not as a
matter of corporate social responsibility or business ethics, but
because "corporate survival depends in part on there being some
'fit' between the values of the corporation and its managers, the
expectations of stakeholders in the firm and the societal issues
which will determine the ability of the firm to sell its products."72
There is considerable evidence that serving the interests of
employees and customers, as well as broader constituencies like
the local community and the environment, is an effective way of
on the interest of shareowners and not on the interest of employees and customers").
For a description of each group's unique role in shaping management practice, see
Jeanne M. Logsdon & Patsy G. Lewellyn, Expanding Accountability to Stakeholders:
Trends and Predictions, 105 BUs. & Soc'Y REV. 419, 421-23 (2000).
68 See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 59, at 53 (explaining the phrase as "the
necessity for an organization to manage the relationships with its specific
stakeholder groups in an action-oriented way").
69 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 61, at 75.
70 See id. (documenting the range of interests that managers actually take into
account).
71 See id. at 77 ("[The simple hypothesis [is] that corporations whose managers
adopt stakeholder principles and practices will perform better financially than those
that do not.").
72 FREEMAN, supra note 59, at 107.
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increasing profitability.73 A recent metastudy analyzed eighty-
three studies of the relationship between financial success and
management's commitment to the interests of a broad range of
stakeholders. More than half of the eighty-three studies showed
that taking into account the interests of stakeholders correlated
with positive financial performance. 74 Moreover, although a
significant number of studies demonstrated mixed results, or no
relationship at all, only a handful showed a negative
correlation.75 The authors conclude that:
[T]he empirical evidence on this matter is somewhat unreliable
and the results mixed. However ... there is very little evidence
of a negative association between social and financial
performance.... [T]he empirical studies do not prove that
corporations can "do well by doing good," but neither do they
disprove that view, and there is no substantial evidence that
corporations can "do well by doing harm. '76
Although some stakeholder theorists go beyond the
descriptive and instrumental to enter the normative arena,
management theorists (as opposed to business ethicists) often fail
to explore the normative bases for their positions. 77  A
bewildering variety of justifications for the rights of shareholders
is offered by those who make explicit the grounds for believing
that, as an ethical matter, business should be managed in light of
the interests of all stakeholders. 78 Among the grounds proffered
73 See POST ET AL., supra note 10, at 26-28 (summarizing research conducted on
this topic).
74 See id. at 27 (citing JOSHUA D. MARGOLIS & JAMES P. WALSH, PEOPLE AND
PROFITS? THE SEARCH FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY'S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE (2001)).
75 See id. (indicating that only nineteen studies showed no relationship).
76 Id. at 28 (citation omitted); see also ANN SVENDSEN, THE STAKEHOLDER
STRATEGY: PROFITING FROM COLLABORATIVE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 18-19
(1998) (summarizing evidence that care for stakeholders increases profits).
77 See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 45
(1989) (noting that a lack of normative foundations is a serious weakness of much
stakeholder theory); PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that much current
thinking on stakeholder theory pays little attention to the normative aspect).
78 The issue here is the basis for special obligations to stakeholders as such,
over and above what the business owes to all human beings based on general ethical
principles. Obligations to stakeholders are in addition to obligations owed to those
who are not stakeholders. To say a competitor, for instance, is not a stakeholder is
not to deny that businesses have an obligation to avoid killing competitors for
market advantage. See PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 124-25.
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are the common good, 79 Kantian deontology,80 property rights
theory,81 feminist theory,8 2 social contracts theory,83 fairness,8 4
and communitarianism. 8 5
In my view, stakeholder theory is much more satisfactory at
the descriptive, instrumental, and normative levels than either
the ownership or nexus of contracts model with their focus on
shareholder wealth maximization. Partisans of those theories,
however, criticize stakeholder theory on grounds that it fails to
provide any clear guidance to managers or to courts as to the
legitimate goals of businesses, and therefore will lead to vastly
increased agency costs as managers take advantage of the
situation to pursue their own interests.8 6
This criticism ignores the fact that even under current law,
managers do not single-mindedly seek to maximize shareholder
wealth.8 7 In fact, the apparently clear guidance given by the
shareholder wealth maximization norm is largely specious. To
say that shareholder wealth should be maximized is to propose a
goal, but it does not dictate how to achieve that goal. It does not,
therefore, provide any sharply focused prescription of what
actions management should take and what actions it should
avoid. Under the business judgment rule, directors have
extraordinarily wide scope in deciding how to pursue the goal. In
Delaware, for instance,
79 See Antonio Argandofia, The Stakeholder Theory and the Common Good, 17 J.
Bus. ETHICS 1093, 1093 (1998).
80 See William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the
Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS 166-71
(Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 4th ed. 1993) (exemplifying the
resort to Kantian philosophy in explaining firm behavior).
81 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 61, at 65.
82 See Andrew Wicks, Daniel Gilbert & R. Edward Freeman, A Feminist
Reinterpretation of the Stakeholder Concept, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 475 (1994).
83 See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999).
84 See Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory and a Principle of Fairness, 7 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 51, 52 (1997) ("I believe a superior.., model of stakeholder relations can
be found in... an obligation based on... 'fairness.' "); PHILLIPS, supra note 13.
85 See Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory, 8 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 679, 679 (1998) (discussing stakeholder theory in the context of
communitarianism).
86 See Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 6.
87 See id. at 10 ("[Clorporate decision-makers have a moral obligation to balance
a decision's impact on stakeholders against its economic impact on shareholders.").
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the presumption established by the business judgment rule is
all but impossible to overcome, at least in cases where directors
lack any apparent conflict of interest. In that context,
shareholder-plaintiffs are required to show either that the
substance of the challenged business decision was so egregious
that "no reasonable business person would have made the
decision," or that the board was grossly negligent in informing
itself of all material information reasonably available to it
before acting.88
Thus, the shareholder-wealth-maximization norm does not, in
practice, provide anything like the clear guidance its proponents
claim justifies it.
Neither does the shareholder-wealth-maximization norm
actually prevent corporate directors and officers from using their
positions to benefit themselves rather than shareholders. Even
ignoring Enron, WorldCom, and similar scandals, recent
experience makes clear that managers subject to the
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm have plenty of room to
feather their own nests. Between 1990 and 2003, CEO pay rose
315%,89 while corporate profits rose by 144%.90 In 2005 alone,
total CEO compensation at the Fortune 500 companies rose by an
average of 54%,91 while the S&P 500 Index rose just 5.6%.92
Between 1993 and 2005, Lee Raymond, chairman of the board
and CEO of Exxon, received total compensation of $686 million,
or $144,573 per day.93 While Exxon has been highly profitable,
super-sized compensation is not necessarily a reward for
outstanding performance. According to Forbes magazine, in
2005, none of the ten most highly compensated CEOs ranked
higher than 29th out of 500 in efficiency (measured by total
return on equity over a six-year period).94 The second most
88 Letsou, supra note 54, at 179-80 (citation omitted).
89 UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., CEO PAY CHARTS: CEO PAY, STOCK PRICES,
CORPORATE PROFITS, WORKER PAY, AND INFLATION, 1990-2003, http://www.
faireconomy.org/research/CEOPay-charts.html.
90 Id.
91 Scott DeCarlo, Special Report: CEO Compensation, FORBES.COM, Apr. 21,
2005, http://www.forbes.com]2005/04/20/05ceoland.html.
92 See Yahoo! Finance, S&P 500 Index: Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.
com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC&a=00&b=l&c=2005&d=00&e=1&f=2006&gm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2007).
93 Jad Mouawad, For Leading Exxon to its Riches, $144,573 a Day, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2006, at Al.
94 See DeCarlo, supra note 91 (referencing the efficiency of the highest paid
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highly compensated, Barry Diller of IAC/Interactive Corp., whose
total compensation was $156 million, ranked 178th in
efficiency. 95 During 2005, the price of IAC/Interactive's stock
rose by just 2%.96 The shareholder-wealth-maximization norm as
a tool for controlling agency costs is strikingly ineffective.
None of this is to deny that controlling agency costs is
important. Perhaps because stakeholder theory has been
developed mostly by management theorists and business
ethicists rather than lawyers, little attention has been paid to its
implications for corporate governance and mechanisms of
corporate accountability. Even on the basic question of whether
a stakeholder conception of business should be reflected in
fundamental changes to structures of corporate governance-for
example, worker representation on the board-there is no
consensus.97 There is no reason to think, however, that the
wealth-maximization-norm is the only way to achieve
management accountability. 98 The field of estate administration
confirms that fiduciaries who owe obligations to multiple
constituencies, some of whom have conflicting interests, can be
held accountable under the law.99
The principal weakness of stakeholder theory-one I contend
could be remedied by John Paul II's understanding of what it
means to be a human person and his concept of business as a
community of persons-is its lack of an adequate normative
foundation, which stems ultimately from the lack of an adequate
concept of what it means to be a human person. As the former
dean of the Haas School of Business at the University of
California Berkley writes, stakeholder theory suffers from the
fact that our society
does not have a strong philosophical foundation to explain
collaborative behavior. That is, while we have libertarian
CEOs).
95 Forbes.com, Bary Diller, CEO of IAC/InterActiveCorp (IACI), http:/!
www.forbes.com/static/pvp2005/LIRMHED.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
96 Id.
97 See PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 31-32.
98 See BLAIR, supra note 7, at 225-26; Donaldson & Preston, supra note 61, at
87 (responding to the reluctance to shift from a shareholder- to stakeholder-centered
corporate norm).
99 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 798-802
(7th ed. 2005) (referencing a case where such a fiduciary was held liable for a breach
of his duty of care).
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philosophies rationalizing the positive effects of individual
initiatives and collectivist philosophies positing the social gains
of shared efforts and rewards, we do not have a clear-cut logical
system laying out the costs and benefits of behavior motivated
simultaneously by personal desires and an awareness of
external obligations. 100
With rare exceptions, 10 1 stakeholder theories reflect an
explicit or implicit individualism. They see stakeholders as
individuals who have something at stake in the business, rather
than persons who are members of a community. 10 2 They treat all
goods as allocable-such that giving more to A means giving less
to B-and ignore the existence of communities of higher goods
which are not allocated but participated-such that A's having
more does not diminish what is available to B. This results in a
conception of stakeholders as opposing groups that have to be
managed, 103 rather than as persons who collaborate with each
other. In reality, firms are made up of persons who collaborate
with each other despite significant elements of intra-firm
competition.
II. JOHN PAUL II'S VISION OF BUSINESSES AS
COMMUNITIES OF PERSONS
John Paul II's vision of businesses shares important
elements with some of the stakeholder models, but rests on a
different vision of what it is to be human and of what the goals of
all human activity, including business activity, should be. John
Paul II's vision is primarily normative, but at the same time
rooted in reality.
When he looks at businesses, John Paul II does not see legal
fictions that serve to interconnect a series of contracts. Neither
does he see businesses as devices whose primary purpose is
100 Raymond E. Miles, Foreword to WILLIAM HALAL, THE NEW MANAGEMENT:
DEMOCRACY AND ENTERPRISE ARE TRANSFORMING ORGANIZATIONS, at x (1996).
101 See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 85, at 679 ("[W]hile they clearly have
significantly divergent interests ... and values, [those involved in a corporation] also
have some significant shared goals.").
102 See HELEN J. ALFORD & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH
MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 57-58
(2001) (discussing the shortcomings of stakeholder models as accepting only
individualistic conceptions of the person).
103 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. HILT ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
COMPETITIVENESS AND GLOBALIZATION 26-31 (1999) (giving examples of the need to
manage opposing groups of stakeholders).
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enriching their owners. For John Paul II, a business is a
"community of persons."'10 4 More specifically, it is a "community
of work,"'10 5 made up primarily of people who "work with each
other." 0 6
These descriptions might seem to leave no room for
investors. John Paul II does, however, recognize that capital is
essential to a business, and that those who supply capital are
vital components of the business, although he rejects the concept
of business as "a 'society of capital goods.' "107 He sees a business
as "a 'society of persons' in which people participate in different
ways and with specific responsibilities, whether they supply the
necessary capital for the company's activities or take part in such
activities through their labour."'08 The assets investors provide
make work possible and productive, and the investors are,
therefore, an essential part of the business, but in John Paul II's
view capital is at the service of work, not vice versa. 10 9
John Paul II is far from being alone in conceptualizing
business in communitarian terms.1 0 His vision of businesses as
104 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS 35 (1991)
[hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS] (emphasis omitted); see also Pope John Paul II,
Address to Christian Union of Business Executives 3 (Mar. 7, 1997) [hereinafter
Address to Christian Union of Business Executives], available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn.pauLii/speeches/1997/march/documents/hfj
p-iispe_19970307_ imprenditori-dirigenti en.html (stating that businesses are
communities of men); Pope John Paul II, Address to Business and Trade-Union
Leaders on the Ethical Dimension of the Global Economy 2 (May 2, 2000),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/johnpaul ii/speeches/2000/apr-jun
documents/hfjp-ii-spe_20000502_workers-audienceen.html (discussing man's
participation in business understood as a community).
105 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 32.
106 Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Address to Christian Union of Business
Executives, supra note 104, 3 (stating that a business is a community of people
who "work with others and for others").
107 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 43.
108 Id.
1o9 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXERCENS 23 (1981)
[hereinafter LABOREM EXERCENS].
110 See, e.g., Charles Handy, The Citizen Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1997, at 28 ("A public corporation should now be regarded not as a piece of
property but as a community-although a community created by common purpose
rather than by common place .... The core members of communities are more
properly regarded as citizens rather than as employees or 'human resources'-
citizens with responsibilities as well as rights."); David Millon, Communitarianism
in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAw 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the "sociological and
moral phenomenon of the corporation as community"); David Millon, Default Rules,
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communities of persons who work, however, rests on a highly
articulated and original theory of the meaning of person,
community, and work. To appreciate his approach to business,
we need to examine each of these topics as well as his concepts of
property and markets.
A. The Value and Dignity of Persons11'
Persons, their value, and their dignity are central to John
Paul II's thought. 112 He asserts over and over again that "man is
the only creature on earth that God willed for itself."113 In John
Paul II's vision, every human being is endowed with immense
dignity and worth because each person is created in "'the image
and likeness' of God." 114 He views the concept of persons made
in the image and likeness of God as the "basis of all Christian
anthropology." 115 Jesus, he says, "'fully reveals man to man.' "116
Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job
Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 981-82 (1998) (pointing out that the "corporation-
as-community model" suggests that "the web of ongoing relationships constituting
productive activities involves significant elements of interdependence and
cooperation that cannot be captured fully by reference solely to a set of bilateral
contracts"); Robert C. Solomon, Competition, Care, and Compassion: Toward a
Nonchauvinist View of the Corporation, in WOMEN'S STUDIES AND BUSINESS ETHICS
151 (Andrea Larson & R. Edward Freeman eds., 1997) (arguing that, from a feminist
perspective, a corporation should be viewed as "a community, a group of people
working together for (more or less) shared goals and with an (again more or less)
shared culture.... [lit is first and foremost a group of people who stand with each
other in a variety of personal and professional relationships.").
11 I have explored some of the ideas contained in this section, and section B, in
John F. Coverdale, The Legacy of John Paul H to Lawyers, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1,
3-10 (2005) (discussing the value and dignity of persons).
112 See John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., Pope John Paul H and the Dignity of the
Human Being, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 65, 65 (2003) (discussing the development
of Pope John Paul II's thought before he became pope).
113 See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER REDEMPTOR HOMINIS 13 (1979)
[hereinafter REDEMPTOR HOMINIS] (quoting SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL
COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ET SPES 24 (1965) [hereinafter
GAUDIUM ET SPES]).
114 JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER MULIERIS DIGNITATEM 6 (1988)
[hereinafter MULIERIS DIGNITATEM] (quoting Genesis 1:2 7).
115 Id. (emphasis omitted).
116 Letter from John Paul II to Artists 14 (Apr. 4, 1999) (quoting GAUDIUM ET
SPES, supra note 113, 22), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
john-paul-iiletters/documents/hf jp-ii let23041999_artistsen.html; see also
REDEMPTOR HOMINIS, supra note 113, 8; John Paul II, APOSTOLIC LETTER TERTIO
MILLENIOADVENIENTE 4 (1994).
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Although John Paul II's theory of what it means to be human
acquires its full richness and depth in a specifically Christian
context, it rests not only on religious faith but also on
penetrating observations of human nature and behavior. It
offers many insights that speak to those who do not share John
Paul II's religious convictions. 117
John Paul II identifies the basis for human dignity in the
fact that human beings have "a rational and free nature";118 an
intellect and a will that give them the capacity to know the truth,
and embrace it freely." 9 Their likeness to God and dignity derive
from being persons "capable of self-determination and self-
possession."'120 A human being has dignity-and is an image of
God-because it is "capable of existing and acting 'for itself,' that
is, capable of a certain autoteleology, which means capable not
only of determining its own ends but also of becoming an end for
itself."12'
John Paul II considers the "capacity for community with
other persons"'22 another source of human dignity: "Being a
person in the image and likeness of God.. . also involves existing
in a relationship, in relation to the other 'I.' "123 Like the belief
that man is made in the image and likeness of God, John Paul
II's stress on the human capacity for community as a source of
dignity has theological as well as philosophical foundations.
From a theological perspective, John Paul II sees human ability
to relate to others as a reflection of the inner reality of God,124
who Catholics believe is not a solitary, isolated being, but a
trinity of three persons-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 25
117 See generally Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity?, in A CATHOLIC
MODERNITY?, at 13-37 (James L. Heft ed., 1999) (discussing Catholic humanism and
the relations between it and secular humanism).
118 KAROL WOJTYLA, PERSONS AND COMMUNITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 317
(Theresa Sandok trans., 1993) [hereinafter PERSONS AND COMMUNITY]. "Intellect
and freedom are essential and irrevocable properties of the person. Herein also lies
the whole natural basis of the dignity of the person." Id. at 318.
119 Grounding human dignity on the fact that men and women are free, knowing
subjects has deep roots in Catholic thought. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA I, Q. 93.
120 See PERSONS AND COMMUNITY, supra note 118, at 317.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 318.
123 MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 114, 7.
124 See id.
125 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 232-56 (2d ed. 1997)
(summarizing Catholic teaching on God as Trinity of persons).
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Furthermore, John Paul II contends that human dignity rests
not only on our ability to relate to other human beings, but also,
and especially, on our ability to enter into a personal relationship
with God. 126 From a philosophical perspective, John Paul II's
assertion of human dignity based on the capacity for entering
into a mutual relationship with another "I" echoes some of the
principal themes of twentieth century thought, particularly
Martin Buber's in-depth exploration of the reality of inter-
personal relations and their consequences. 127
B. Community: Persons as Social
Although John Paul II stresses the primacy of persons and
rejects Marxism and other forms of collectivism, he is far from
embracing the individualism, 128  embraced by American
conservatism, 129 that sees "freedom as the ultimate goal and the
individual as the ultimate entity in society."'130
126 Pope John Paul II, Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on
Evolution 5 (Oct. 22, 1996), available at http://www.ewtn.comllibrary/
papaldoc/JP961022.htm ("St. Thomas observed that man's resemblance to God
resides especially in his speculative intellect, because his relationship with the
object of his knowledge is like God's relationship with his creation. But even beyond
that, man is called to enter into a loving relationship with God himself, a
relationship which will find its full expression at the end of time, in eternity."
(citation omitted)).
127 See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 2d
ed. 1958) (describing how human existence may be defined by the way in which we
engage in dialogue with each other, with the world, and with God). There are many
English editions. One of the more recent is the 1996 Touchstone edition. MARTIN
BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufman trans., 1996). In his book, Crossing the
Threshold of Hope, John Paul II recognized his indebtedness to Buber. See JOHN
PAUL II, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 36 (1994) (noting Buber's impact on
religious philosophy by commenting that "[t]he philosophers of dialogue, such as
Martin Buber... have contributed greatly to [religious] experience").
128 See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 14 2-63 (1985) (discussing individualism's
origins, ambiguities, limits, and risks in modern life).
129 One example of this individualism, albeit an extreme one, is the "objectivist
philosophy" of Ayn Rand, whose novel Atlas Shrugged was listed second after the
Bible in a 1991 survey conducted for the Library of Congress and the Book of the
Month Club in which respondents were asked to name a book that had changed
their lives. See Esther B. Fein, Book Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at C26. In
Rand's view, the ultimate moral value for each individual is his or her own well-
being, and selfishness, understood as "concern with one's own interests," should be
considered a virtue. See AYN RAND, VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS, at vii (1964).
130 Daniel Rush Finn, The Economic Personalism of John Paul II: Neither Right
Nor Left, J. MARKETS & MORALITY, Spring 1999, at 74, 79 (quoting FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 5). In an essay first published in 1961, the future John
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Freedom's primacy in individualistic thought derives from a
perception of the individual as a self-contained being whose goal
in life advances via untrammeled autonomy-making decisions
without regard to standards other than one's own preferences.
John Paul II did not see the individual as self-contained. His
fully-realized human being is not an atomistic, isolated
individual, but rather a member of disparate communities-
ranging in size, from family to country, and even to the entire
world.
John Paul II views each person as an "unrepeatable reality"
with a personal history that is uniquely his own. 131 He stresses,
however, that each person writes that history "through numerous
bonds, contacts, situations, and social structures linking him
with other men, beginning to do so from the first moment of his
existence on earth, from the moment of his conception and
birth.... [He lives] in the sphere of society and. very diverse
contexts." 132 This could be mistaken for a rather trite statement
of the obvious fact that every human being needs help in meeting
his needs and in developing his potential, as even the most
resolute individualist admits. To the contrary, it is a profound
assertion that others are not limited to serving as resources for
the achievement of the individual's goals. According to John
Paul II, we do not need others primarily so that we may receive
from them, but rather that we may give to them, because persons
reach their full development only by giving themselves to others:
[M]an... cannot "fully find himself except through a sincere
gift of self." This might appear to be a contradiction, but in fact
it is not. Instead it is the magnificent paradox of human
Paul II succinctly laid out his opposition to both individualism and totalitarianism:
[P]ersons may easily place their own individual good above the common
good of the collectivity, attempting to subordinate the collectivity to
themselves and use it for their individual good. This is the error of
individualism, which gave rise to liberalism in modern history and to
capitalism in economics. On the other hand, society, in aiming at the
alleged good of the whole, may attempt to subordinate persons to itself in
such a way that the true good of persons is excluded and they themselves
fall prey to the collectivity. This is the error of totalitarianism, which in
modern times has borne the worst possible fruit.
KAROL WOJTYLA, Personaliszm Tomistyczny (Thomistic Personalism), in PERSONS
AND COMMUNITY, supra note 118, at 174.




existence: an existence called to serve the truth in love. Love
causes man to find fulfillment through the sincere gift of self.133
In John Paul II's view, the ability to enter into personal
relationships with others is an essential characteristic of persons.
"[T]o be a person," he says, "means to be capable of
participation."'134 Reaching out to others, entering into I/Thou
relationships with them, is an essential part of human
flourishing. "[Man's] existing and acting together with other
human beings enables him to achieve his own development, that
is, the intrinsic development of the person."'135
Although he is fully aware of the human capacity for
selfishness and lack of concern for others, 36 John Paul II is
convinced that human beings remain at the deepest level not
self-centered but "other-centered-oriented outward toward the
other. Another way of saying this is that humans have the
133 Letter from John Paul II to Families 11 (Feb. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Letter
to Families] (quoting GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 113, 24), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaul ii/letters/documents/hfjp-ii let_
02021994_familiesen.html. The concept that human beings find their ultimate
fulfillment not by taking things for themselves, but by making a loving gift of
themselves to others is directly rooted in Christian revelation and concretely in the
doctrine of the Trinity. See, e.g., MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 114, 18
("[T]his description, indeed this definition of the person [as finding fulfillment in the
sincere gift of self], corresponds to the fundamental biblical truth about the creation
of the human being-man and woman-in the image and likeness of God."). Catholic
theology sees in the Trinity three divine persons who each completely possess the
divine being, which is also fully possessed by each of the other divine persons.
Further, the divine persons are defined precisely by their relationship to each other.
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 125, 232-56 (describing
the relationship between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). The idea that
persons find fulfillment in giving themselves to another is a concept of personhood
that can appeal to those who do not accept its religious foundation because, as John
Paul II noted, it reflects the "truth about man which is confirmed by the every
experience of humanity." Letter to Families, supra, 6.
134 KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON 275 (Andrzej Potocki trans.,1979).
135 Id.
136 John Paul II's personal experience of the Nazi occupation of Poland and the
brutally repressive Communist regime that followed it left no room for a
Pollyannaish view of human nature. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Address to Faithful
of the Church of Turin 4 (May 24, 1998), available at http://www.vatican.
va/holy-father/john-paul ii/travels/documents/hfjp-ii-spe_24051998_sindoneen.
html (recalling the images of human suffering reflected in "the millions of people
who die of hunger, of the horrors committed in the many wars that soak nations in
blood, of the brutal exploitation of women and children, of the millions of human
beings who live in hardship and humiliation on the edges of great cities, especially in
developing countries .... [and] those who do not enjoy basic civil rights, the victims
of torture and terrorism, the slaves of criminal organizations.").
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capacity to love-that mysterious ability to desire the good for
others, to give of themselves for others, and to go out of
themselves to seek union of mind and heart with others."'137
Experience confirms that all men and women are capable of
turning in on themselves and treating others as mere
instruments for the satisfaction of their needs or whims. But
experience also bears out John Paul II's contention that a focus
on self, far from being a manifestation of human flourishing,
prevents human beings from reaching their full potential and the
happiness that comes with it.138 We know from personal
experience that we are capable of overcoming the inclination to
selfishness and of giving generously of ourselves to others.
Examples of selfless behavior are undoubtedly encountered more
frequently among family members and close friends than in
business settings, and those that are found outside of families
generally do not go as deep, but the reality of a human capacity
for selflessness extends beyond the family.
Human capacity for transcending self suggests to John
Paul II that the world of business relationships is not
irremediably destined to be dominated exclusively by an
individualist pursuit of self-interest. However common such
businesses may be, they are morally aberrant and incompatible
with the deepest human aspirations. They make it difficult or
impossible to establish among those who comprise them the
137 Kristina Johannes, Protecting the Human Environment: Alienation as Social
Critique, RELIGION & LIBERTY, Apr. 2003, at 6, 6. This understanding of human
beings as essentially social has deep roots in Catholic thought. In fact, Thomas
Aquinas asserts that "it is natural to all men to love each other." ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, bk. III, pt. II, at 128 (Vernon J. Bourke trans.,
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956). Hobbes' more pessimistic view of human
nature summed up in the famous phrase "homo homini lupus est" [man is a wolf to
his fellow man] stands in sharp contrast to the traditional Catholic understanding of
human nature (even after original sin), and reflects the pessimism of many
Protestant Reformers who were convinced human nature was totally corrupted by
original sin. See Dennis R. Kuhns, Atonement and Violence, QUODLIBET J., Oct.-Dec.
2003, http://www.quodlibet.net/kuhns-atonement.shtml.
138 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 41 (discussing the consequences
of one's alienation from others). For a secular approach to this view, see MARTIN E.P.
SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO
REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2004) (arguing that what the
author calls 'Meaningful Life" consists in using one's strengths in the service of
something much larger than self). See generally GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE
PROGRESS PARADOX (2003) (observing that prosperity has not brought greater
happiness and arguing in favor of finding meaning in service of greater ideals).
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solidarity which should characterize any authentically human
undertaking. 139 Businesses dominated by self-interest are, to use
John Paul II's term, "alienated,"140 not in the Marxist sense, but
in the sense that they involve "a reversal of means and ends,"' 4'
treating human beings--who should always be treated as ends in
themselves--as mere means.
C. Work and Workers142
John Paul II's concept of work is closely tied to his concept of
person. His special conception of work is evinced by his
statement that "only man works."'143 Machines and animals may
produce useful products, but neither works in the proper sense.144
In his most important treatise on work, the 1981 encyclical
Laborem Exercens, John Paul II pays relatively little attention to
what he calls "work in an objective sense"145: the productive
physical and mental activities we most frequently think of as
work. Instead, his focus is on what he calls "[w]ork in the
[s]ubjective [s]ense," and "[m]an as the [s]ubject of [w]ork."'146
By "work in the subjective sense,"'147 he does not mean
activities that produce external results, but rather activities
insofar as they are human actions. That is to say, "work in the
subjective sense"'148 is comprised of actions performed by a free
subject endowed with dignity because of its intellect and will. 149
The most important thing about those actions is that they both
139 See CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 41.
140 Id.
141 Id. On John Paul II's distinctive use of the concept of alienation, see
Johannes, supra note 137, at 6-7, and Damon Linker, John Paul II, Intellectual, 103
POL'Y REV. 3, 12-13 (2000). For an approach (in my view unconvincing) to John Paul
II's use of alienation that sees it as closely related to the Marxist use of the term, see
GREGORY BAUM, THE PRIORITY OF LABOR: A COMMENTARY ON LABOREM EXERCENS:
ENCYCLIcAL LETTER OF POPE JOHN PAUL 11 (1982).
142 The material in this section expands on ideas explored in an earlier article
by this author. See Coverdale, supra note 111, at 33-35 (discussing John Paul II's
approach to work and workers).
14 3 LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 109, Introduction.
144 LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 109, 5 ("[E]ven in the age of ever more
mechanized 'work', the proper subject of work continues to be man.").
145 Id. (emphasis omitted).
146 Id. 6.
147 Id. (emphasis omitted).
148 Id. (emphasis omitted).
149 See id. (describing a person as a conscious and free subject who decides about
himself).
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proceed from such a subject and in some way express and modify
it. Machines can produce goods and services, but only men and
women "work" in the full and proper sense of the term precisely
because they are persons "capable of acting in a planned and
rational way, capable of deciding about [themselves], and with a
tendency to self-realization."150  For this reason, "[a]s a person,
man is ... the subject of work,"'151 and work "concerns not only
the economy but also, and especially, personal values."'5 2
John Paul II acknowledged that the economic value of work
is a function of the goods and services it produces, but he
maintained that "[t]he sources of the dignity of work are to be
sought primarily in the subjective dimension, not in the objective
one."'153 Work is valuable in the deepest sense not because of
what it produces but because "the one who carries it out is a
person, a conscious and free subject, that is to say a subject that
decides about himself."'154
John Paul II finds in Jesus Christ, who dedicated most of his
life to manual labor, confirmation of his conviction that "the basis
for determining the value of human work is not primarily the
kind of work being done but the fact that the one who is doing it
150 Id.
151 Id. (emphasis omitted).
152 Id. 15. In the related context of the relations between capital and labor in
the process of production, John Paul II has no doubts about the priority of work:
"[L]abour is always a primary efficient cause, while capital, the whole collection of
means of production, remains a mere instrument or instrumental cause." Id. 12
(emphasis omitted). Capital should be thought of as subordinate to labor, and "at the
service of work." Id. (emphasis omitted). Capital-however sophisticated and
technologically advanced-is only a "workbench." Id. 13. Its worth and value have
their roots in the service it renders to work. Furthermore, work precedes the
workbench that is capital and partially responsible for its existence. Capital is in
fact the result of two inheritances:
[T]he inheritance of what is given to the whole of humanity in the resources
of nature, and the inheritance of what others have already developed on the
basis of those resources, primarily by developing technology, that is to say,
by producing a whole collection of increasingly perfect instruments for
work. In working, man also "enters into the labour of others."
Id. (quoting John 4:38).
153 Id. 6.
154 Id. We might be inclined to think of this as the ethical value of work, but
John Paul II refers not to the conformity of the actions to ethical norms but to the
value and dignity they have because the person performing those actions "fulfills
himself' in them. PERSONS AND COMMUNITY, supra note 118, at 265. He calls this
"personalistic value," and distinguishes it from ethical values. Id.
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is a person."155 Just as all men and women share equally the
dignity and worth that emanates from their condition as persons
despite the many differences that exist between them,156 so too do
all types of work have a dignity and worth that derives not from
the economic, artistic, or cultural value of what is produced but
from the fact that they are the actions of a human person.
Since the industrial revolution, we have grown accustomed
to thinking of work as a factor at the service of capital. We
consider it natural to think of those who own capital as hiring
and firing workers as needed to make their capital profitable.
Workers-and not only manual workers--are frequently treated
as mere "instrument[s] of production,"'157 rather than as "the true
purpose of the whole process of production."'158 The verbal
expressions of this ideology are no longer as crass as they were in
the early nineteenth century-in fact, it is fashionable to claim
that "[p]eople are our [g]reatest [a]sset"159-but American
businesses continue to attempt to solve their problems, or simply
to improve their profitability, by shedding workers. 160
John Paul II argues that the mental constructs that underlie
these practices reverse the proper order of the elements. 161
Rather than thinking of work at the service of capital, we should
consider capital "subordinate to human labour,"'162 and "at the
155 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 6.
156 See supra notes 114, 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing human
dignity).
157 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 7 (emphasis omitted).
158 Id.
159 E.g., Careers at Pfizer, http://www.pfizer.co.uk/template4.asp?pageid=3 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007).
160 See LOUIS UCHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE AMERICAN: LAYOFFS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES (2006) (documenting the move away from a culture of permanent
employment to a culture of mass layoffs in the name of efficiency). According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, despite a relatively robust economy, from January
through March 2006 there were 3268 layoffs that involved fifty or more workers. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MASS LAYOFF STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data-tool=latest-numbers&ser
ies id=mlsms00nn0119003 (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). Over 338,000 people filed
initial unemployment claims as a result of such layoffs. Id. In March 2006, following
its $67 billion acquisition of BellSouth, AT&T announced its plan to cut 10,000 jobs.
AT&T Merger to Claim 10,000 Jobs, BBC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/4781596.stm.
161 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 109, 17 (stating that it is not profit
but the worker that should guide the focus of economics).
162 Id. 12.
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service of work."'163  Capital, however sophisticated and
technologically advanced, is only a "workbench."'164 Like the most
primitive wooden carpenter's workbench, all capital derives its
worth and value from the service that it renders to work.
The subjective value of work leads directly to the conclusion
that work is not "a special kind of 'merchandise,' or... an
impersonal 'force' needed for production";165 it is not a commodity
to be bought and sold in the market at whatever price the law of
supply and demand sets and under whatever conditions to which
the parties agree. 166 To do so would be to treat man "as an
instrument of production, whereas he-he alone, independently
of the work he does-ought to be treated as the effective subject
of work and its true maker and creator";167 that is, as "the true
purpose of the whole process of production."'168
Ignoring the subjective value of work and treating it as just
one more factor in the productive process, "considering human
labour solely according to its economic purpose,"'169 involves a
"practical materialism."'170  This attitude, which at least
implicitly underlies the theory that maximizing profits is the goal
of business, reflects "a conviction of the primacy and superiority
of the material, and directly or indirectly places the spiritual and
the personal (man's activity, moral values and such matters) in a
position of subordination to material reality."'17  Rather than
being treated as "instrument[s] of production"'172 who are valued
163 Id. (emphasis omitted).
164 See id..
165 Id. 7.
166 See id. (noting that it is an error to treat man as an instrument and not as a
maker). We have progressed well beyond the Lochner conviction that the
Constitution prohibits virtually all government intervention in the field of labor
contracts. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Nonetheless, persons
entering contracts to provide personal services still enjoy far less protection than
parties to other kinds of contracts. They are rarely able, for instance, to successfully
invoke doctrines like detrimental reliance, promissory estoppel, and implied or
quasi-contract to protect their investment in firm-specific capital. See Scott E.
Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 196, 206 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter
eds., 1991).
167 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 7 (emphasis omitted).
168 Id.
169 Id. 13.
170 Id. (emphasis omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. 7 (emphasis omitted).
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only in so far as they contribute to profitability, workers of all
sorts-from executives, through mid-level managers, to unskilled
laborers-should be considered "the effective subject[s] of work
and its true maker[s] and creator [s] ."173
A similar undervaluing of the subjective dimension of work
occurs whenever work is viewed as a necessary evil, something
we are driven to only by necessity. By contrast, because of its
subjective value,
work is a good thing for man.... It is not only good in the sense
that it is useful or something to enjoy; it is also good as being
something worthy, that is to say, something that corresponds to
man's dignity, that expresses this dignity and increases
it.... Work is a good thing for man-a good thing for his
humanity-because through work man not only transforms
nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also achieves
fulfillment as a human being and indeed, in a sense, becomes
"more a human being."174
Work, of course, does not always lead to human fulfillment.
In part, the ability to achieve fulfillment depends on the
character and attitude of the individual performing the work.
Even under ideal conditions, some people work half-heartedly
and find no fulfillment in their work. Nonetheless, some ways of
structuring work are more conducive than others to human
fulfillment in work. John Paul II considers it essential to create
a social order of work, which will
enable man to become, in work, "more a human being" and not
be degraded by it not only because of the wearing out of his
physical strength (which, at least up to a certain point, is
inevitable), but especially through damage to the dignity and
subjectivity that are proper to him.1 75
John Paul II does not provide a list of the elements that an
appropriate social order of work would entail, but it is not
difficult to glean from his writings what some of them would be.
'Man fulfills himself by using his intelligence and freedom." 176
Therefore, structuring businesses in ways that enable workers to
become more human in work requires focusing on their human
characteristics as persons: their ability to plan, their capacity for
173 Id.
174 Id. 9 (emphasis omitted).
175 Id.
176 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 43.
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self-determination, their tendency to auto-realization, and their
need to form communities with others. 177 All of this requires a
work environment characterized by "collaboration, communion
and relationships marked by respect and mutual esteem, [and]
by cooperation and solidarity."'178  The freedom, self
determination, and participation characteristic of persons 179
require management styles that involve workers at all levels in
decision-making and give them as much autonomy and control
over decisions that affect their work as is compatible with the
demands of efficiency.180
Changes in the legal regime could certainly effect change in
this area, especially at the highest levels of corporate governance.
It would be possible, for instance, to require that employees have
a voice on boards of directors. The most important example of
such legislation is the German Co-Determination Act of 1976
that gives workers 50% of the seats on the boards of the largest
companies.' 8 ' It is beyond the scope of this article to weigh the
pluses and minuses of worker representation on boards of
directors in general, or the merits of the German approach in
particular, although recent economic analysis has indicated that
it has positive economic effects. 182 Suffice it to say here that
177 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 6 ('Man has to subdue the earth
and dominate it, because as the 'image of God' he is a person, that is to say, a
subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding
about himself, and with a tendency to self-realization. As a person, man is therefore
the subject of work. As a person he works, he performs various actions belonging to
the work process; independently of their objective content, these actions must all
serve to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a person that is his by reason
of his very humanity.").
178 Letter from Pope John Paul II to the Diocese of Rome on the Gospel of Work
6 (Dec. 8, 1998), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy father/ohn-paul-ii/
letters/1998/documents/hf-jp-ii-let-19981207_workersen.html.
179 See supra notes 118-23, 134-35 and accompanying text.
180 John Paul II stresses that if "existing and acting together with other human
beings" is to lead to human flourishing, it cannot be merely mechanical; to be
fulfilling, a person must be free in performing an action. WOJTYLA, supra note 134,
at 275.
181 See DIETRICH HOFFMAN, THE GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION ACT 1976
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976), at 27-28 (1976); Herbert Wiedemann,
Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 79
(1980).
182 See Felix R. Fitzroy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-Determination, Efficiency, and
Productivity 19 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Paper No. 1442, 2004) (indicating




worker participation in corporate governance reflects the values
of freedom, autonomy, and participation John Paul II sees as
essential if work is to play an appropriate role in our lives. A
legal regime based on this vision would include mechanisms for
giving workers at all levels a say in the decisions that affect their
lives, while respecting the demands of efficiency.
For purposes of giving people greater scope for exercising
their freedom and autonomy and developing genuine
communities of participation on a day-to-day basis, worker
representation on boards of directors may be less important than
issues of job design and management styles at the lower levels of
businesses. These are also complex issues on which there is
abundant literature. 8 3 Neither John Paul II nor Catholic Social
Thought more generally provides specific prescriptions, but the
principle of subsidiarity provides some guidance.
Subsidiarity prescribes that in any organization or set of
organizations, higher levels should not exercise functions that
can be effectively carried out at lower levels.18 4 It goes beyond
this to require higher levels to provide the aid ("subsidy") lower
levels may need to carry out a particular function. Higher level
organizations should perform functions directly only in cases
where the lower level cannot do so even with appropriate
assistance. 185
Although often framed in Catholic Social Thought as a free-
standing principle in its own right, 8 6 subsidiarity is rooted in the
concepts of persons as self-determining agents and of the
intrinsically social character of human beings. Application of the
principle of subsidiarity creates spaces in which free decisions
can be made and in which people can create communities that
express their social nature. In terms of job design and
183 See, e.g., Tove H. Hammer, Steven C. Currall & Robert N. Stern, Worker
Representation on Boards of Directors: A Study of Competing Roles, 44 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 661 (1991).
184 See Jared Bayer, Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political
Principle of Subsidiarity in the United States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421, 1445-48
(2004).
185 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 48 (discussing applications of the
principle in the area of economic life); PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO
ANNO 9 79-80 (1931) [hereinafter QUADRAGESIMO ANNO] (formulating the
principle in general terms).
186 See, e.g., QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 185, 99 79-80 (labeling it a
"grave evil" to "assign to a greater and higher association what lesser organizations
can do").
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management style, this suggests allowing as wide a scope of
autonomy as possible to the people at every level of a business,
starting with the lowest levels.
D. Property and Markets8 7
John Paul II affirms the value of private property. Like
earlier Popes, he sees it as an important component of human
dignity and autonomy, as "an extension of human freedom:"'8 8
A person who is deprived of something he can call "his own,"
and of the possibility of earning a living through his own
initiative, comes to depend on the social machine and on those
who control it. This makes it much more difficult for him to
recognize his dignity as a person, and hinders progress towards
the building up of an authentic human community. 189
John Paul II is much more enthusiastic about markets than
his predecessors. He recognizes that "the free market is the most
efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively
responding to needs."'190 In addition, he values free markets
because "they give central place to the person's desires and
preferences, which, in a contract, meet the desires and
preferences of another person."191 Thus, they respect the freedom
and autonomy of persons and permit them to express their tastes
and preferences. 192
Despite the practical and theoretical significance he accords
to private property and free markets, John Paul II does not
consider either property or markets the primordial principle of
social and economic organization. Rather, he finds the
187 Some of the material in this section first appeared in Coverdale, supra note
111, at 40-43 (discussing John Paul II on private property).
188 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 30.
189 Id. 13.
190 Id. 34 (emphasis omitted).
191 Id. 40.
192 At least in mature consumer societies, the abundance of choices offered by
markets is not an unmixed blessing. People often have difficulty choosing between
large numbers of options, and may be less happy and satisfied than if they had fewer
choices. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 3 (2004).
John Paul II frequently addresses this concern in his critique of consumerism. See,
e.g., CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 36; Raymond J. De Souza, John Paul II
and the Problem of Consumerism, RELIGION & LIBERTY, SEPT.-OCT. 1999, at 8,
available at http://www.acton.org/publicat/randl/pdf/rl v09n5.pdf (explaining why
Pope John Paul II sees such danger in consumerism).
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"characteristic principle of Christian social doctrine"193 and the
"cornerstone of the Church's social teaching"'194 in "the universal
destination of the earth's goods,"' 95 i.e., in the fact that "the goods
of this world are originally meant for all."' 96 "God gave the earth
to the whole human race," he says, "for the sustenance of all its
members, without excluding or favouring anyone."' 97  The
principle that the goods of the earth-including not only natural
resources but also the products of science and technology'9 -- are
meant to serve all men and women comes before the principle of
private property and provides its meaning. 199
John Paul II does not consider recognition of rights to
private property as incompatible with the universal destination
of the goods of the earth. On the contrary, he justifies private
property as a way of putting the goods of the earth at the service
of all. In part, this is a question of property being widely
distributed so that each person has sufficient property of his or
her own. But it also affects the content and use of property
rights.
John Paul II does not see property as an unlimited right.
Ownership of property does not bring with it the right to use an
item exclusively for the owner's benefit. "'In making use of the
exterior things we lawfully possess, we ought to regard them not
just as our own but also as common, in the sense that they can
profit not only the owners but others too.' "200 Owners have "the
193 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS 42 (1987)
[hereinafter SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS].
194 Pope John Paul II, Angelus Address 2 (July 8, 2001), available at
http://www.vatican.vaholy-father/john-paul-ii/angelus/2001/documents/hf-jp-
ii-ang_20010708_en.html.
195 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 6 (emphasis omitted).
196 SOLLICITUDO REI SOCLALIS, supra note 193, 42.
197 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 31.
198 See Pope John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of
Peace 7 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-
paul-ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii-mes_20041216_xxxviii-world-day-for-
peaceen.html ("[T]he new goods derived from progress in science and
technology .... in application of the principle of the universal destination of the
earth's goods, need to be put at the service of humanity's basic needs.").
199 Pope John Paul II, Message for Lent (June 29, 1991), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/johnpaul iilmessages/lent/documents/hfjp-
iimes29021992_lent-1992_en.html ('[The] universal destination of goods ... comes
before all particular forms of private property and. . . should give them their true
meaning.").
200 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 30 (quoting GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra
note 113, 69).
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responsibility not to hinder others from having their own part of
God's gift; indeed, [they] must cooperate with others so that
together all can dominate the earth. '201
John Paul II expresses the effect of the universal destination
of goods on property rights with the metaphor of a "social
mortgage" 20 2 on all property. Because it is subject to a social
mortgage, the right to property is not "absolute and
untouchable. ' 203 It is "subordinated to the right to common use,
to the fact that goods are meant for everyone."20 4 All private
property "has an intrinsically social function, based upon and
justified precisely by the principle of the universal destination of
goods."205
In this light, "[o]wnership of the means of production.., is
just and legitimate [only] if it serves useful work."20 6 John Paul
II explicitly rejects the "programme of capitalism practised by
liberalism and by the political systems inspired by it."207 "[T]he
exclusive right to private ownership of the means of
production... [is not] an untouchable 'dogma' of economic life."20 8
"[T]he only legitimate title to... [possession of the means of
production] is that they should serve labour, and thus, by serving
labour, that they should make possible the achievement
of... the universal destination of goods and the right to common
use of them."20
9
Just as John Paul II sees private property as a right subject
to limitations and at the service of the universal destination of
the goods of the earth, his acceptance of free markets is limited
and conditional. He readily concedes their utility for meeting
201 Id. 31.
202 Pope John Paul II, Message to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign 4 (Sept.
23, 1999) [hereinafter Message to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign], available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul 
-ii/speeches/1999/september/documents
hf-jp-ii-mes_23091999jubilee-2000-debt-campaign-en.html; Pope John Paul II,
Opening Address at the Puebla Conference pt. III, 4 (Jan. 28, 1979), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/john-paul-ii/speeches/1979/January/documents/hf
jp-ii-spe_19790128_messico-puebla-ecumen-meeting-it.html (translated from
Italian by the author); SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALiS, supra note 193, 42.
203 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 14.
204 Id.
205 SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIs, supra note 193, 42.
206 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 43.




needs that are "'solvent,' "210 i.e., that are "endowed with
purchasing power,"211 and for utilizing those resources that are
"'marketable,' "212 i.e, capable of obtaining a satisfactory price.
He points out, however, that many vital human needs are not
endowed with purchasing power and would therefore go unmet if
we were to rely exclusively on market mechanisms. "[T]here are
many human needs which find no place on the market."213  If
markets cannot meet such needs, other mechanisms must be
found to meet them; the rationality of the market is not the
ultimate criterion of justice. Society should try to regulate
markets in such a way as to maximize the efficiency they can
produce while ensuring that the needs of all its members,
including the weakest, are met. 214
John Paul II's views that the ownership of productive
property is justified primarily by the service it renders to work
and that market outcomes should not be the sole or ultimate
criterion of social policy are opposed to the view that ownership
of stock brings with it the right to have the company managed
solely for the benefit of the shareholders. John Paul II's view of
property and the market suggests that the law should require
companies to be managed for goals broader than shareholder
wealth maximization. 215 This does not mean, however, that
profit does not have a legitimate role to play in business.




214 Id. 35 (commenting that "the market [should] be appropriately controlled
by the forces of society and by the State, so as to guarantee that the basic needs of
the whole of society are satisfied"). There is no doubt that John Paul II appreciated
the virtues of markets to a much higher degree than his predecessors but
conservative American commentators like Michael Novak, Stephen Bainbridge, and
Richard John Neuhaus vastly exaggerate John Paul II's enthusiasm for markets and
American style capitalism. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL &
DOING GOOD: THE CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALIST 57, 69-70 (1992);
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 125-32
(1993); Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 10.
215 Clive Beed and Cara Beed argue that John Paul II's theory of property calls
for worker ownership of the businesses in which they work. They point to ESOPS as
well as collectives like the famous Mondrag6n collective in Spain as ways of
achieving this goal. See Clive Beed & Cara Beed, Work Ownership Implications of
Recent Papal Social Thought, 60 REV. SOC. ECON. 47, 56-59, 63-69 (2002). Certainly
worker ownership of businesses is congruent with John Paul II's thought, but it does
not seem to be required in every case.
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E. The Role of Profit and Efficiency
Because of the dignity and worth of every human person,
John Paul II refuses to raise profit to the level of the ultimate
goal of businesses. 216  John Paul II recognizes profit as a
legitimate business goal 217 and understands that businesses
must be concerned with making a profit, since profit is an
essential part of business, without which no business would long
survive. He insists, nonetheless, that "the purpose of a business
firm is not simply to make a profit."218 "[T]o pursue goals aimed
at maximizing profit would be decidedly narrow, 219 and an
216 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 35 (commenting that human and
moral factors besides profit must also be considered). Of course, the value of persons
also leads him to reject Marxism and other forms of totalitarianism, which
subordinate persons to the goals of the larger society. In John Paul II's view:
[T]he fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature. Socialism
considers the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within
the social organism, so that the good of the individual is completely
subordinated to the functioning of the socio-economic mechanism. Socialism
likewise maintains that the good of the individual can be realized without
reference to his free choice, to the unique and exclusive responsibility
which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus reduced to a
series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the
autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very subject whose
decisions build the social order.
Id. 13.
217 See id. 35; Pope John Paul II, Message to the Participants in the
Conference on "The Business Executive: Social Responsibility and Globalization"
2-3 (Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Message on Social Responsibility and
Globalization], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul iispeeches/
2004/march/documents/hfjp-ii-spe20040305_martinoen.html (recognizing that
while profit is a goal, it is not the only goal of business).
218 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 35; see also Message on Social
Responsibility and Globalization, supra note 217, 3 ("[The pursuit of profit is not
the sole end of [business] activity .... ).
219 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Directors of the Banking Group Capitalia
(Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/
speeches/2004/september/documents/hfjp-ii-spe_20040917_capitalia-en.html. John
Paul II echoed the views of Leo XIII in the first of the social encyclicals by noting
that Leo XIII criticized approaches "determined solely by efficiency, with a view to
increasing profits." CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 4. Not only does John
Paul II not accept profit maximization as the overriding goal of existing businesses,
he insists that the owners of capital have an ethical obligation to consider broader
needs when choosing where to make new investments. "[T]he decision to invest in
one place rather than another, in one productive sector rather than another, is
always a moral and cultural choice." Id. 36. In choosing where to invest, "[r]espect
for the human person and his fundamental right to lead a worthy life must prevail
over interests of accumulating benefits or maintaining privileged positions." Pope
John Paul II, Address to the Ambassador of Columbia 3 (Nov. 7, 1998), available
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"excessive search for profit"220 would be an aberration. Profits
are "an indication that a business is functioning well[,]" 221 but a
business, no matter how profitable, cannot be considered a
success if its people are "humiliated and their dignity
offended. '222 From a positive point of view, John Paul II sees
finding "[t]he correct relationship between profit and
solidarity 223 as one of the major challenges of those who direct
businesses.
John Paul II's rejection of profit maximization as the goal of
business is not based on a naive leftist or socialist agenda, but on
a philosophy and a theology which sees human flourishing as the
goal to be attained, and profit as merely a means toward
achieving that goal.224 John Paul II does not directly address the
question of whether-as many law and economics theorists would
maintain-single-minded pursuit of owners' profit will eventually
bring economic benefits to all participants in the economy. Even
if that premise. could be demonstrated, however, he would still
assert that making profit the primary goal of the human activity
that is running a business inverts the order of ends and means.225
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/johnpaul iilspeeches/1998/november/
documents/hfjp-ii-spe_19981107_ ambassador-colombiaen.html.
220 Address to Christian Union of Business Executives, supra note 104, 2;
accord Message to the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign, supra note 202, 4 (' The law of
profit alone cannot be applied to that which is essential for the fight against hunger,
disease and poverty.").
221 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 35.
222 Id.
223 Address to Christian Union of Business Executives, supra note 104, 4
(urging executives to harmonize "the development of the worker's ability ... with
the rational production of goods and services."); see also Message on Social
Responsibility and Globalization, supra note 217, 2 (commenting that business
leaders need to "combine the legitimate pursuit of profit with a deeper concern for
the spread of solidarity.").
224 See Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic
Social Thought, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 561, 565 (2004) (discussing profits as a
means for attaining the common good).
225 Supporting this idea, John Paul II states:
The attainment of the worker's rights cannot however be doomed to be
merely a result of economic systems which on a larger or smaller scale are
guided chiefly by the criterion of maximum profit. On the contrary, it is
respect for the objective rights of the worker-every kind of worker: manual
or intellectual, industrial or agricultural, etc-that must constitute the
adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy ....
LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 17
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A profit may be made developing "new and higher forms of
satisfying human needs,"226 but it may also be made by
stimulating "artificial new needs which hinder the formation of a
mature personality."227  Prostitution, child pornography, and
sales of heroin to minors may be profitable and the businesses
engaged in them may be highly efficient. Society, however,
should hardly celebrate their success. Yet a theory of business
which measures a business' success exclusively by the profits it
generates is in no position to distinguish between profitable
businesses that contribute to human flourishing and those that
undermine it.228
The problem is not confined to businesses engaged in
producing products that are socially deleterious. Businesses
engaged in more legitimate activities may also have a negative
impact on human flourishing, for instance because of how they
treat their employees. John Paul II insists that a business, no
matter how profitable, cannot be considered a success if its
people are "humiliated and their dignity offended."229 This occurs
in sweatshops and in other obvious "forms of exploitation,
especially to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable workers, of
immigrants and of those on the margins of society."230  The
problem is not, however, confined to those on the margins of
society. As lawyers, we should consider the modern profit-driven
large law firm which pays its associates handsomely, but subjects
them to a work regime which leaves no time for family, friends,
or for the other elements of human fulfillment.
The law and economics defense of profitability as the goal of
corporations rests on the assertion that the single-minded focus
on profitability will lead to increased efficiency in the production
226 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 36.
227 Id.
228 For some time now, economists have been aware that the total amount of
goods and services produced is not an adequate measure of well-being. See, e.g.,
Hans Werner Holub, Some Critical Reflections on Measures of Net Economic Welfare,
29 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 317, 318 (1983) ("[Household] consumption... is only a
very limited part of total welfare."). This insight has found its way into introductory
economic texts. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
405 (16th ed. 1998). More recently, it has made it into the popular press. See, e.g.,
Grossly Distorted Picture: It's High Time that Economists Looked at More Than Just
GDP, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2006 ("GDP... was never intended to be the definitive
yardstick of economic welfare.").
229 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 35.
230 Id. 15.
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of goods and services. 231 John Paul II is certainly aware that
goods and services are essential to human well-being.232
Consequently, he accepts that every form of economic
organization must be judged on its efficiency in producing goods
and services. 233 Nonetheless, efficiency is, in his view, far from
being the final criterion in judging systems of economic
organization. He has criticized "the cult of an often soulless
efficiency 234 and has spoken of the problems that arise "when
society is organized solely according to the criteria of efficiency
and productivity."23 5
Efficiency, understood by proponents of shareholder wealth
maximization as increased total output from the same inputs, 236
cannot be the sole criterion in judging a social and economic
system.237 John Paul II points out that we must be concerned not
231 See supra text accompanying notes 87-96 (criticizing this view and
discussing the efficiency scores of some of the highest paid corporate officers).
232 Regarding the goods that are necessary for survival, John Paul II has
repeatedly lamented "the overwhelming tragedy of hunger throughout the world."
Pope John Paul II, Address to the General Audience 1 (Nov. 13, 1996) [hereinafter
Address to the General Audience], available at http://www.ewtn.com/library
papaldoc/JP961113.htm. He has called for efforts to wipe out "the tragic scandal of
hunger." Id. Over and above what is needed for survival, John Paul II sees some
level of well-being as indispensable to living with dignity and developing one's
human potential. He is painfully aware that the lack of necessary goods can easily
prevent people from "succeed[ing] in realizing their basic human vocation."
SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 193, 28. He insists that all men and women
have a right to the "things necessary for one's personal development." CENTESIMUS
ANNUS, supra note 104, 6.
233 He recognizes, for instance, that the "inefficiency of the economic system"
played a major role in the downfall of the Marxist regimes of Eastern Europe.
CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 23-24.
234 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Participants in the Colloquium on
Capitalism and Ethics 2 (Jan. 14, 1992), available at http://www.vatican.
valholy-fatherjohn-paul-iispeeches/1992january/documentshf-jp-ii-spe 19920114
_capitalism-ethicsen.html.
235 Pope John Paul II, Message for the XXX World Communications Day 4
(May 19, 1996), available at http://www.vatican.vaholy-father/john-paul ii/
messages/communications/documents/hfjp-iimes 24011996_world-communications
-dayen.html.
236 This definition of efficiency is often referred to as Hicks-Kaldor efficiency.
Under this criterion, a project is efficient if gainers from the project could, in
principle, compensate the losers, whether they in fact do so or not. See, e.g., John
Gowdy, Toward a New Welfare Economics for Sustainability, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
211, 213 (2005) (describing the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test).
237 See Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 882 (2004) (discussing the moral and normative
judgments implicit in an appeal to efficiency as the ultimate criterion for judging
economic activity).
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only with the total amount of goods produced, but also with their
distribution.238 A system that produces a large amount of goods
and services, but in which a few wealthy people receive most of
the benefits while the majority of the population lives in poverty,
is not a just system.239 John Paul II does not call for absolute
equality of income or wealth, but he does believe that human
dignity and solidarity require that the goods of the earth be
employed to meet the needs of all. He finds "[o]ne of the greatest
injustices in the contemporary world"240 in "the poor distribution
of the goods and services originally intended for all."' 241 He
describes as a "scandal... the coexistence of persons who lack
the basic essentials with others who have a superabundance." 242
He urges his listeners to work to overcome "inequality,
oppression and selfishness,"243 and classifies inequality between
social groups as a "social sin" 244 in the same category as "the
drug trade, the recycling of illicit funds, corruption at every level,
the terror of violence, the arms race, racial
discrimination.., and the irrational destruction of nature."245
Short of situations where some persons lack the essentials
for survival or for minimal human dignity, John Paul II does not
specify the point at which social and economic inequality become
objectionable. I personally believe he would have found the
increasing disparities in both wealth and income in the United
States objectionable, 246 but that is obviously a matter of
238 See Pope John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Bishops of Brazil from
the South Regions III and IV on Their "Ad Limina" Visit 4 (Nov. 26, 2002),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2002/
november/documents/hfjp-ii-spe_20021126_brazil-sul-iii-iven.html (criticizing
"unequal distribution of income that is reaching high levels").
239 See Pope John Paul II, Angelus Address 2 (Sept. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/John-paul-ii/angelus/2004/documents/hfjp-ii-ang
_20040926_.en.html (discussing the "imbalance between wealth and poverty"
(emphasis omitted)).
240 SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 193, 28.
241 Id.
242 Address to the General Audience, supra note 232, 1.
243 Pope John Paul II, Address to Young People at Plovdiv Cathedral 2 (May
26, 2002), available at http://www.vatican.vaholy-father/johnpaul-ii/speeches/
2002/may/documents/hfjp-ii spe_20020526_youth-bulgaria en.html.
244 JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ECCLESIA IN
AMERICA 56 (1999).
245 Id.
246 According to IRS statistics for the year 2004 (the last year for which this
data is available): the top 1% of taxpayers reported 19% of all income; the top 5% of
taxpayers reported 33% of all income; and by contrast, the bottom 50% of taxpayers
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speculation. What is clear is that he did not believe that
everything that efficiently increased wealth could be considered a
success no matter how that wealth was distributed.
On a deeper level, John Paul II rejected economic efficiency
as the ultimate criterion in judging a business---or any other
human activity-because economic goods, although essential to
human flourishing, are merely instrumental. Human fulfillment
is not primarily a matter of "having" more things, but of "being" a
more fully developed human person.247 To achieve the goal of
being a fully developed human, we may need to have more
things, but the ultimate goal is not "to spend life in enjoyment as
an end in itself. '248 Rather, it is a life oriented toward "truth,




The ultimate goal of all human activity, including economic
activities, should be to contribute to the full human flourishing of
those involved. How that will be accomplished will vary, of
course, with the activity. A school's way of accomplishing this
will be very different from that of a hospital, which will in turn
be different from that of a clothing manufacturer. The school will
do so in the first place through the education it imparts; the
hospital will do so through the health care services it provides;
and the clothing manufacturer will do so through the clothes that
it makes and sells. Each can be judged on the quality of the
goods and services it provides and on how efficiently it uses
reported only 14% of all income. GERALD PRANTE, SUMMARY OF LATEST FEDERAL
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX DATA tbl.1 (2006), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/
ff66.pdf. In 2003, the top 1% of households owned 57.5% of corporate wealth. David
Cay Johnston, Corporate Wealth Share Rises for Top-Income Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2006, at 22.
In 1965, the average American CEO earned twenty-four times what an average
production worker earned. ECON. POL'Y INST., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: CEO
PAY (2004-05), http://www.epinet.org/books/swa2004/news/swafacts-ceopay.pdf. In
2004, the average CEO pay was 431 times that of the average production worker.
SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2005: DEFENSE CONTRACTORS GET
MORE BucKs FOR THE BANG 1 (2005), http://www.faireconomy.org/press/2005/
EE2005.pdf.
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resources to produce them. Profitability is an important measure
of success in these areas.
In the final analysis, however, the inherent dignity and
worth of persons means that all human institutions should have
as their ultimate goal the full development of each of the persons
who comprise it. Each institution has its owns goals, which may
be very limited, but that goal should be pursued in a way that
contributes in some fashion to the human flourishing of the
people who comprise the institution and of the people it affects.
"'[T]he origin, the subject and the purpose of all social
institutions is and should be the human person .... '250
Put in more technical terms, all human institutions,
including businesses, should aim not only to achieve their
particular goals, whatever they may be, but to contribute to the
common good. The common good is not simply the aggregate of
the goods of all the members of the society. Rather, "[i]t is the
sum of all those social conditions which allow the human dignity
of all to be respected, and their basic needs to be met, while
giving men and women the freedom to assume responsibility for
their own lives."25'
The pursuit of the common good in all its fullness is the goal
of political communities, but it cannot be attained unless a
multitude of smaller communities, including businesses, make
their own contributions. They can do so by pursuing their own
proper goals in a way that promotes "all the goods necessary for
integral human development in the organization, in such way as
to respect the proper ordering of those goods." 252
250 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER VERITATIS SPLENDOR T 97 (1993)
(quoting GAUDIUMETSPES, supra note 113, 25).
251 CATHOLIC BISHOP CONFERENCE OF ENG. & WALES, VOTE FOR THE COMMON
GOOD 9 (2001), http://www.catholic-ew.org.uk/resource/vcg/vcg.doc. This concept
stands in sharp contrast to large strands of American liberal thought which reject
altogether the idea of common good and substitute in its place "the preservation of
the maximum possible individual choice according to one's private conception of the
good." Louis Dupre, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM 172, 183 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach eds., 1994).
252 ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 102, at 45 (emphasis omitted). Although
they do not frame the question in terms of the common good, partisans of
shareholder wealth maximization as the only legitimate goal of business reject the
notion that businesses should strive to contribute to the common good other than by
enriching the stockholders. Broader social concerns, they say, are the domain of
government. If society wants to pursue other goals, for example fair wages or a clean
environment, it should regulate business, not expect businesses to voluntarily
undertake them. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text (discussing the
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More concretely, in this vision, businesses should be
concerned not only with making a profit, but with a wide range of
broader goals. These would include providing their workers with
wages which are adequate to allow them to live with dignity,
meet their family obligations, and develop their talents;253
nexus of contract theory of the corporation). Given the cost and slowness of
regulation, this seems a dubious proposition even considered purely in terms of
efficiency. See, e.g., THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 297-301 (2005) (pointing out that large corporations
are often better positioned than government to regulate effectively and discussing
recent international undertakings by American businesses such as McDonalds, IBM,
HP, Dell, and Wal-Mart to implement socially and ecologically sound practices).
More important for purposes of this paper, it reflects an atomistic individualism that
conceives of persons and institutions as pursuing purely personal goals and of the
government as the only institution charged with accomplishing larger social goals.
By contrast, John Paul II, and Catholic Social Thought more generally, start from a
vision of society as made up of a myriad of institutions, each of which has a role to
play in contributing to the common good. This leads to the principle of subsidiarity,
which sees government as having ultimate responsibility for the common good, but
envisions many smaller organizations as contributing to it and government as
helping them in their efforts and taking direct responsibility only when smaller
organizations are unable to achieve the goal. See supra notes 183-86 and
accompanying text (discussing "subsidiarity"). For a somewhat similar vision of
society from a non-religious perspective, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 211-27 (1996) and
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 100-03 (2d ed. 1998).
253 Catholic Social Thought has long stressed the obligation to pay a 'living
wage" or a "family wage" sufficient to support a worker and his or her family. See
LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 109, 19; GAUDIUMETSPES, supra note 113, 67;
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 185, 71; LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM
NOVARUM 45 (1891). One of the most important early American exponents of
Catholic Social Thought, John A. Ryan, published an entire book on the subject at
the beginning of the twentieth century. See JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE (rev. &
abr. ed. 1920) (discussing how a living wage would be the best formulated plan to
improve social and working conditions of people). The concept of a living wage lies
behind the movement in favor of minimum wages. See generally WILLIS J.
NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE: THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
MINIMUM WAGE PROGRAM (1997) (documenting the history of the minimum wage
program in the United States).
In recent years, in the face of federal failure to increase the minimum wage, the
movement for a living wage has become an important grass roots phenomenon in
many local communities and some states. See Jon Gertner, What Is a Living Wage?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006 (Magazine), at 38 (documenting individual efforts to raise
the minimum wage). Additionally, minimum wage activists have phrased their
arguments primarily in moral terms. See id. Although they rarely cite Catholic
Social Thought, the positions they take are very similar to its classic formulations.
The most common criticism of the concept of a living wage is that it is
impractical and will end up hurting the poor by causing jobs to dry up. See generally
JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT: THE CASE AGAINST A HIGHER
MINIMUM WAGE (1996), http://www.house.gov/jec/cost.gov/regs/minimum/
2006]
520 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:473
treating their employees with the respect owed to their dignity as
human beings;254 providing jobs and working environments in
which people can develop their talents and relate to others in
truly human ways;255 producing quality goods and services that
meet real needs of the community; 256 and protecting and
improving the natural environment and using resources in
responsible ways.257
In addition to these elements that Catholic Social Thought
has long stressed, John Paul II places special emphasis on the
building of an authentic community. 258 Because, as we have
seen, he believes that persons achieve their fulfillment only
through participation in communities, he says: "[T]he purpose of
a business firm.., is to be found in its very existence as a
community of persons who in various ways are endeavouring to
satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the
service of the whole of society."259
The needs John Paul II refers to include economic and
material ones,260 but go well beyond that. Human needs are not
against/against.htm. Recent economic research has cast serious doubt on this
accepted wisdom; cf. David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania: Reply, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1397, 1406-13 (2000) (refuting evidence
from a different study that demonstrated an increase in minimum wage lessened job
availability); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 772, 778-89 (1994) (examining the impact of wage increases in fast food
restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania); Louis Uchitelle, A Pay Raise's
Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 12, 1995, at D1 (reporting that economic studies show that
increases in the minimum wage have had little effect on employment); Jeff
Chapman, Employment and the Minimum Wage: Evidence from Recent State Labor
Market Thends 10-13 (Econ. Policy Inst., Paper No. 150, 2004) (providing evidence to
measure minimum wage's impact on the workforce).
254 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 109, 9 (explaining how work should
provide dignity to man).
255 See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 104, 15 (extolling environmental
improvements that would better workers' lives).
256 Id. 36.
257 See id. 37 (imploring man to recognize his responsibility to protect the
environment).
258 See id. 35 (describing businesses as "at the service of the whole"
community).
259 Id.
260 John Paul II recognizes that people could not "realiz[e] their basic human
vocation [if] they [were] deprived of essential goods." SOLLICITUDO REi SOCL4LIS,
supra note 193, 28. He is also acutely aware that many people throughout the
world in fact lack the minimum goods required to live out their human dignity. See
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merely "material and instinctive,"261 but also "interior and
spiritual."262  Those who work in a business should
"together... help one another to mature as human beings"
263
Maturing as a human being involves not merely the
accumulation of more goods, but "the quest for truth, beauty,
goodness and communion with others for the sake of common
growth."264
It may seem wildly unrealistic to introduce concepts like the
quest for truth and beauty and communion with others into a
discussion of business organizations. Yet, it would be tragic to
exclude them from consideration when we think about the goals
of the organizations that dominate the majority of the waking
hours of most people. To dismiss these higher human goals as
irrelevant to the world of business is to condemn most people to
never achieving them, or at best to drive a wedge between the
pursuit of fulfillment and the largest single component of most
people's lives other than, perhaps, sleep.
None of this is to say that businesses should focus
exclusively on the higher human good while ignoring profitability
and efficiency. A business which consistently fails to make an
adequate profit is a business doomed to extinction, no matter
how well it treats its employees or contributes in other ways to
human flourishing. A business, therefore, will not always be able
to choose the course that would be preferable if profit were not a
concern. Instead, it will often be necessary to balance
profitability and efficiency against other factors demanded by the
orientation of the business as a community of persons toward the
full human good of all those who make up the community.
It is certainly not easy to translate the ideas set forth in this
paper into concrete proposals for legal reform. To do so will
require the collaboration of many people with a strong grasp of
both economics and the reality of business as well as of legal
technique. The first step on any journey, however, is to know the
destination. In this, John Paul II is an excellent guide.
id.; JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ECCLESIA IN AFRICA 40 (1995) (noting
the existence of widespread poverty in Africa).
261 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 36.
262 Id.
263 Address to Christian Union of Business Executives, supra note 104, 3.
264 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 104, 36.
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